I did not want to write about ‘xenophobia,’ but I
was unable to contain myself when I saw four of my colleagues standing with anti-‘xenophobia’
posters and with these words printed on them: “injury 2 one, injury 2 all;” “Africa
for Africans;” “Africa Unite;” and “we are all foreigners somewhere.” I am sick
and tired of the word ‘xenophobia’ and the way the petite bourgeoisie are
pretending they have nothing to do with it. However, this article is not about
my dislike for the petite bourgeoisie, but rather about the silences in the
media and conversations on the topic of xenophobia.
I identified five convenient silences that exit
in the popular discourse of ‘xenophobia’ in South Africa. I called it
convenient because everybody know about it but choose rather not to speak about
it. These five silences are: (1) race, (2) gender, (3) locality, (4)
nationality and (5) class. If you consider these five silences that you realise
that what is happening in South Africa is not xenophobia but something completed
different.
Firstly, if you define xenophobia it simple means
is the fear of all strangers. If this is the case then it does not explain why
only a certain group of foreigners are attacked. White European and Chinese foreigners
are not being targeted even though they just as foreign African nationals.
Secondly, the feminist movement also haven't say
anything about this particular incident mainly because the majority of victims
are males. Here the popular discourse is lacking because it does not consider the
gender of the victims.
Thirdly, popular discourse also does not consider
the location/locality of these 'xenophobic' incidents. Yes they refer to the
place like for Diepsloot Soweto or wherever it is happening, but the discourse
neglects to contrast it to where white foreigners are residing. It does not
happen in Sandton or the Waterfront, it happens where the majority of people
are poor and destitute.
Fourthly, popular discourse neglects to contrast
the nationality of the victims to other foreign nationals. Chinese and European
foreigners are not being attacked. It is only some foreign nationals on the
African continent who are being attacked, especially those who own spaza shops.
Finally, the discourse also does not focus on
class. ‘Xenophobia’ in South Africa happens amongst the working class and not
amongst the elite in society. Thus, ‘xenophobia’ is rather class bias.
If we consider these silences in the popular
discourse we have to conclude that it is not xenophobia, it is also not
'Afrophobia.' If it was 'Afrophobia' then foreign nationals from West Africa
would have also been attacked. It is not black on black violence. If it was
black on black violence then black people from all walks of life would have
participated in these attacks. It is also not economic violence or criminality
since it does not explain the pogroms (mob). Crime does not explain the
pogroms.
It has to be something else!
My investigation so far has led me to the
'politics of belonging.' If you see it as a 'politics of belonging' then what
is happening in South Africa is not unique to South Africa. It is happening all
over the continent and the world. In Uganda it is called 'indigeneity, in
Cameroon it is called 'autochthony' and in the USA and Europe it is the ‘anti-immigrant
sentiment.’
The 'politics of belonging' raises the question
as to who may lay the claim that one group belongs more than another in a
particular geographical area. As you would see this already raises issues
around the idea of the national versus the international - nationalism versus
globalisation.
Just a few years ago everyone was hopeful of the
prospects of globalisation; however these incidents the world over see a
retraction into the idea of the national. We have once more become a citizen of
the nation-state. Some argue that the politics of belonging is fuelled by
national consciousness. I am not convinced since the politics of belonging in
most cases are isolated incidences.
So far, through my investigation, I have narrowed
the cause of the politics of belonging to migration and scarcity. What I
observed so far is that there is always a migration from an area of ‘scarcity’
to an area of ‘plenty.’ The migrants integrate themselves amongst the locals
and develop a new national consciousness which they share with the locals.
However, when a scarcity arises a politics of belonging is ensued as to who may
lay claim to the resources. The locals believe since they were the first they
have the sole right over the resource distribution. This automatically leads to
a confrontation especially since some of the migrants developed the same national
consciousness as the locals. They believe they belong just as much as the rest,
especially if they have been there for generations.
The confrontation in most cases has been violent.
However, in Europe and in the USA this confrontation so far has mostly been
through law. In some cases the confrontation develops into a full scale civil
war such as the one in the Great Lakes region of Africa (Burundi, Rwanda,
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo); where the immigrant’s national
consciousness is just as strong as that of the local’s.
If we consider this, the politics of belonging is
a much better explanation then the current ‘xenophobia’ discourse. The consequence
of the discourse will be the following: ‘xenophobia’ will be trapped in a
dominant narrative and will be reinforced by empirical research. This will
blind us from its broader significance.
